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In 1996, at a conference on the "Law of Cyberspace" held at the
University of Chicago, Judge Frank Easterbrook famously. asserted
that the very concept of the "Law of Cyberspace" was as absurd as the
"Law of the Horse." In Easterbrook's colorful account,
Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people
kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing
of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with
prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a
course on 'The Law of the Horse' is doomed to be shallow and
to miss unifying principles.'
Similarly, Easterbrook opined, it is misguided to treat cases involving
the Internet as a distinct field of study. He offered the example of
intellectual property in cyberspace, which, he said, is just the law of
intellectual property applied to cyberspace. Instead of trying to "tailor
the law to the subject," Easterbrook advised the audience to
concentrate on assessing whether our underlying legal principles are
generally sound.2
Congress, at least, did not heed Judge Easterbrook's warning. In the
same year that Judge Easterbrook delivered these remarks, Congress
passed the Communications Decency Act, which attempted to regulate
pornographic content on the Internet. While nearly all of the Act was
struck down3 by the Supreme Court for violating the First
Amendment, one part, now popularly known as Section 230,
remained.
Section 230 limits how and when online intermediaries ("interactive
computer services") can be held legally accountable for the actions of
those who use their platforms and services.4 Subject to exceptions for
violations of federal criminal law and intellectual property law,
"providers or users of an interactive computer service," as the statute
' Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaceand the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,

207 (1996).
2 Id at 208.

3 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
4 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
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called them, are not liable for content created by other users.5 This is
the law that protects social media giants like Facebook and Twitter
from being sued for posts on their platforms and ensures that media
outlets aren't legally responsible for content in their comments
sections. In the view of Section 230 enthusiasts, it is the law that
makes the Internet the most powerful medium of free expression.
Section 230 is considered so central to the development of the Internet
and so essential to its continued operation that it has been called the
"Magna Carta of the Internet," 6 the "foundation of the Internet," "the
First Amendment of the Internet," 7 and the "cornerstone of Internet
freedom." 8 It has also been called "The One Law That's The Cause Of
Everything Good And Terrible About The Internet" 9 as well as "the
most dangerous law on the books right now."o For better or for
worse, Section 230 is, quite literally, the Law of Cyberspace.
While intense support by powerful entities ensured that the law
remained unchanged for more than twenty years, the tide has recently
begun to turn. In 2018, Congress amended the law for the first time,
curtailing its protections with regard to online content relating to sex
trafficking. This amendment was severely criticized by Section 230
advocates, who maintain that further tinkering may spell the end of
5 Id.
Noa Yachot, The 'Magna Carta'of Cyberspace Turns 20: An Interview With the ACLU
Lawyer Who Helped Save the Internet, ACLU (June 23, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu
.org/blog/free-speech/intemet-speech/magna-carta-cyberspace-tums-20-interview-aclu6

lawyer-who-helped [https://perma.cc/72VC-FDCX].
Elizabeth Nolan Brown, Section 230 Is the Internet's FirstAmendment. Now Both
Republicans and Democrats Want To Take It Away, REASON (July 29, 2019, 8:01 AM),
https://reason.com/2019/07/29/section-230-is-the-intemets-first-amendment-now-bothrepublicans-and-democrats-want-to-take-it-away/ [https://perma.cc/2KXL-QPFG].
8 Berin Szoka, Section 230: The CornerstoneofInternetFreedom, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT
7

(Aug. 18, 2009), https://techliberation.com/2009/08/18/section-230-the-comerstone-ofinternet-freedom/ [https://perma.cc/R3YU-QL9P].
Paul Blumenthal, The One Law That's The Cause OfEverything Good And TerribleAbout
The Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2018, 10:01 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/ent

'

ry/online-harassment-section230_n_5b4f5ccle4b0de86f488df86 [https:/perma.cc/XL7XTEGM].
10 Clare Duffy, Marc BenioffSays It's Time to Break Up Facebook, CNN Bus. (Oct. 17, 2019,

7:33 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/16/tech/salesforce-marc-benioff-break-up-facebookboss-files/index.html [https://perma.cc/U9US-5MAX].
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free speech, democracy, and the Internet itself. Critics counter that
Section 230 has led to a dysfunctional marketplace of ideas and the
erosion of democratic values. Calls to amend the law, from across the
political spectrum, have increased in the last few years and have been
met with vociferous opposition." As Professor Jeff Kosseff, author of
a book on Section 230 titled The Twenty-Six Words That Created the
Internet, noted in August of 2019, "[t]here is definitely more attention
being paid to Section 230 than at any time in its history."l 2
Some of this attention has been in patently bad faith. A number of
high-profile politicians have claimed, for example, that the law
requires online intermediaries to be "neutral platforms" or lose their
immunity, 13 a claim unsupported by the text of the statute or case law
interpreting it.14 Such willful misreading for political gain, however,
should not distract from the legitimate scrutiny being applied to the
influential law two decades after its passage.
In creating the Law of Cyberspace, Congress did the opposite of what
Judge Easterbook had urged: rather than clarifying existing legal
principles-in particular, principles of immunity, complicity, free
speech, criminal law, or tort-in light of technological advances and
applying those principles to Internet cases, Congress effectively
upended all those principles in order to accommodate the supposedly
exceptional nature of the Internet.
Of particular concern is how Section 230 has been interpreted to
eradicate the concept of collective responsibility, to obliterate the
distinction between speech and conduct, and to provide a boon to
" Cristiano Lima, How a Widening PoliticalRift Over Online Liability is Splitting
Washington, POLITico (July 9, 2019, 5:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/
9/online-industry-immunity-section-230-1552241 [https://perma.cc/USB3-TW3Z].
12 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Legal Shieldfor Websites Rattles Under Onslaught of Hate Speech,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/technology/section-230-

hate-speech.html.
13 Sarah Jeong, PoliticiansWant to Change the Internet'sMost Important Law. They Should
ReadIt First.,N.Y. TIMEs: OPINION (July 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/26/op
inion/section-230-political-neutrality.html [https://perma.cc/D3WL-ZC35].
'4 Jeff Kosseff, Correctinga PersistentMyth About the Law that Createdthe Internet, REG.
REV. (July 15, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/15/kosseff-correcting-persistentmyth-about-law-that-created-the-internet/ [https://perma.cc/H8JS-J9UU].
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online entities over their offline counterparts. Courts have interpreted
Section 230 to protect online classifieds sites from responsibility for
advertising sex trafficking,' 5 online firearms sellers from responsibility
for facilitating unlawful gun sales,' 6 and online marketplaces from
responsibility for putting defective products into the stream of
commerce.1 7

The law of cyberspace, in other words, has unmade the law of real
space. But careful consideration of Section 230's history, evolution,
and application demonstrate that this dystopian state of affairs is
neither inevitable nor irremediable. The sweeping, destabilizing
interpretation of Section 230 promoted by so many courts is not a
faithful reflection of the text, goals, or intention of the statute. A better
vision is both possible and necessary.
The Internet of 1996 was markedly different than the Internet of 2019.
In 1996, the World Wide Web had been in existence for only seven
years, online commercial activity had only been allowed for four, and
web browsers had become capable of displaying images for only three.
Only 20 million American adults had Internet access, and these users
spent less than 30 minutes a month online. "[W]hat's striking about the
old Web," writes technology journalist Farhad Manjoo, "is how unsure
everyone seemed to be about what the new medium was for.""
Compare that to July 2019, when more than 4 billion people-56% of
the global population-were active Internet users.1 9 The United States
has the third-highest number of Internet users in the world: 293 million

1s

E.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).

16 E.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 2019 WI 47, 386 Wis. 2d 449 N.W.2d 710, cert. denied, No.

19-153, 2019 WL 6257416 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2019).

17 E.g., Oberdorf v. Amazon.com, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 496 (M.D. Pa. 2017), affd in part,

vacatedin part, 930 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2019), vacated en banc, 936 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2019).
" Farhad Manjoo, Jurassic Web, SLATE (Feb. 24, 2009, 5:33 PM), https://slate.com/techn

ology/2009/02/the-unrecognizable-internet-of-1996.html [https://perma.cc/X9SY-L3EF].
" J. Clement, Global Digital Population as ofJuly 2019 (in millions), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/

[https://perma.cc/EML5-J4AA].
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users, or 87% of its population. 20 People now use the Internet not only
to communicate, including via email, text message, and social media
networks, but also to buy and sell merchandise, deposit checks, make
restaurant reservations, watch videos, read books, stream music, and
look for employment. 2 1 Today, there is almost no aspect of most
people's daily lives that does not have an online component.
"Cyberspace" is no longer a realm distinct or separable from physical
space; the offline and online worlds are inextricably linked.
Section 230 played a key role in the explosion of the Internet's
influence. Section 230's operative clause, subsection (c), is titled
"Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and screening of offensive
material."2 2 This title suggests that Section 230 is meant to provide
"Good Samaritan" immunity in much the same sense as offline "Good
Samaritan" laws. Such laws do not create a duty to aid-unlike the law
of many other countries, there is no general obligation under U.S. law
to render assistance to strangers in distress, subject to a few
exceptions-but instead provide immunity to people who, despite
having no legal obligation to do so, attempt to aid others in distress. 2 3
These laws, which exist in every state, recognize that the lack of legal
requirement to offer assistance combined with potential punishment
for offering such punishment creates serious disincentives to offer
such aid.24 While Good Samaritan laws cannot require people to offer
assistance, they can encourage people to assist by removing the threat

of liability for doing so.
Why did Congress think that the Internet needed a Good Samaritan
law? Two early Internet cases help explain Congress's concerns. In a

J. Clement, Internet Usage in the United States - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Aug. 20,
2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/internet-usage-in-the-united-states/
[https://perma.cc/NMM2-ANLC].
21 J. Clement, Most Popular Online Activities ofAdult Internet Users in the United States as of
November 2017, STATISTA (last edited Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
183910/internet-activities-of-us-users/ [https://perma.cc/76A4-G8Q6].
22 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
23 See, e.g., Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins. Co., 290 Wis. 2d 571, 714 N.W.2d 183 (Wis.
2006).
24 See id at 191-92; see also Danny R. Veilleux, Construction andApplicationof "Good
Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294, § 2[a] (1989).
20
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1991 case, a federal New York court found that an online
communications service called CompuServe was not responsible for
defamatory posts that appeared on one of its discussion forums.2 5 In
defamation law, liability can be imposed on publishers as well as
authors of libelous speech on the theory that publishers have
knowledge of the content they publish. The court declined to treat
CompuServe as a publisher because the communications service did
not review the content it hosted.2 6 Therefore, the court found, the
service was not responsible for unlawful content.2 7
The web service Prodigy took a different approach to content posted
by users than CompuServe. Prodigy marketed itself as a familyfriendly service, and made attempts to review and remove
objectionable posts made to its message boards. In 1995, "wolf of
Wall Street" Jordan Belfort sued Prodigy over allegedly libelous
remarks made on online bulletin boards hosted by Prodigy. A state
New York court found Prodigy liable for the defamatory content on
the grounds that it, unlike CompuServe, had made an effort to review
material posted to its services.2 8
The two cases, taken together, seemed to stand for the proposition that
online services that did nothing to address objectionable content would
be rewarded, while those who attempted to intervene would be
punished. Congress was concerned that rulings like this created a
disincentive for online services to make efforts to moderate content-a
worrisome result that could lead to the Internet becoming a cesspool of
objectionable content.
Accordingly, one clear purpose of Section 230 is simply to remove
that disincentive. Subsection (c)(2) assures providers and users of
interactive computer services that they will not be held liable with
regard to any action "voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 142-43.
27 Id
28 Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, 4-5 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
25
26
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obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable" or "taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access" to such material. 2 9 Given that it tracks the familiar legal
principles of its namesake, subsection (c)(2) is the relatively
uncontroversial portion of Section 230. Standing alone, this subsection
of this "Good Samaritan" law does little more than apply an existing
legal concept to the Internet.3 0
Subsection 230(c)(1), on the other hand, has been interpreted in ways
that not only are at odds with Good Samaritan laws, but also with a
host of other legal principles and settled law. It is also the section that
has proven most influential in the development of the Internet, "the
twenty-six words that created the Internet," 3 1 to use Professor
Kosseff's phrase: "No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider." 32
To parse the meaning of this subsection, it is useful to recall, as
mentioned above, that while U.S. law does not impose a general duty
to aid, it does recognize a limited concept of shared responsibility for
harm. In the physical world, third parties can sometimes be held
criminally or civilly liable for other people's actions. Many harmful
acts are only possible with the participation of multiple actors with
various motivations. The doctrines of aiding and abetting, complicity,
and conspiracy all reflect the insight that third parties who assist,
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018).
Indeed, Subsection (c)(2) could be read as merely expressing a basic principle of First
Amendment law. Most online intermediaries are private, as opposed to state, actors. As such,
they have First Amendment rights that allow them to refuse to carry or promote speech against
their will. See, e.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019)
("[W]hen a private entity provides a forum for speech, the private entity is not ordinarily
constrained by the First Amendment because the private entity is not a state actor. The private
entity may thus exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum."); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("Ifthere is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
31 Kosseff, supra note 14.
32 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018).
29
30
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encourage, ignore, or contribute to the illegal actions of another person
can and should be held responsible for their contributions to the harms
that result, particularly if those third parties benefited in some material
way from that contribution.
Among the justifications for third-party liability in criminal and civil
law is that this liability incentivizes responsible behavior. For
example, it is a central tenet of tort law that the possibility of such
liability incentivizes individuals and industries to act responsibly and
reasonably. Conversely, granting of immunity from such liability risks
encouraging negligent and reckless behavior.
In sharp contrast to laws governing offline behavior, online
intermediaries have been granted near-total immunity when their
products, services, and platforms have been used to harm.3 3 Courts
have interpreted Section 230(c)(1)'s prohibition on treating online
intermediaries as "publishers or speakers" of content provided by their
users very broadly. It has been read to provide sweeping immunity to
message boards like 8chan (now 8kun), which provide a platform for
mass shooters to spread terrorist propaganda, as well as to online
firearms marketplaces such as Armslist, which facilitate the illegal sale
of weapons used to murder domestic violence victims. It has even been
used by Amazon to attempt to avoid responsibility for facilitating the
sale of a defective dog leash that blinded a woman. 34
These online intermediaries are in no sense "Good Samaritans."3 5
They are not individuals who voluntarily intervene to preyent or
mitigate harm caused by someone else. They are at best passive
bystanders who do nothing to intervene against harm, and at worst,
1 See Mary Anne Franks, Our Collective Responsibilityfor Mass Shootings, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct.

9. 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/mass-shooting-responsibility.html
[https://perma.cc/TC43-SD8P]; Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet
a Better Place. It Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-was-supposed-to-makethe-internet-a-better-place-it-failed [https://perma.cc/8BW4-Q5HD].

Oberdorf v. Amazon.com Inc., 930 F.3d 136, 151-52 (3d. Cir.), vacated, 936 F.3d 182 (3d.
Cir. 2019).
31 See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans§ 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 401, 416 (2017).
3
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they are accomplices who profit from harm. If their conduct occurred
offline, they could be held accountable for their role in causing harm.
Why should the fact that it occurs online change this result?
One answer that is sometimes offered is that the Internet is a medium
of speech, and the First Amendment requires that regulations of speech
must be much less burdensome than regulations of conduct.
References to the importance of free speech in prefatory sections of
Section 230 reinforce this point-"[t]he Internet and other interactive
computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues for intellectual activity" 36 -as
does the terminology of
230(c)(2) of "publishers" and "speakers."
But this in some ways raises more questions than it answers. Much
speech is not protected, or not fully protected, by the First
Amendment. As the Court reiterated in U.S. v. Stevens, there are "welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem." 37 Even speech that is protected can be
regulated in certain ways, including through theories such as
distributor liability. It is not clear that Section 230's prohibition of
publisher liability must be read to preclude distributor liability, as the
Fourth Circuit did in Zeran v. AOL. 3 8
But even more fundamentally, it is well past time to question whether
the vast array of activities now conducted through the Internet can
accurately or meaningfully be described as "speech." One Section 230
advocate has effusively described how the entire suite of products we
think of as the Internet-search engines, social media, online
publications with comments sections, Wikis, private message boards,
matchmaking apps, job search sites, consumer review tools, digital
marketplaces, Airbnb, cloud storage companies, podcast distributors,
app stores, GIF clearinghouses, crowdsourced funding platforms, chat
U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2018).
* United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010) (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
3 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331-33 (4th Cir. 1997).
3647
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tools, email newsletters, online classifieds, video sharing venues, and
the vast majority of what makes up our day-to-day digital
experience-have benefited from the protections offered by
Section 230.39

But many of the offline cognates of the activities listed here would not
be considered speech at all. While the Supreme Court takes a broad
view of what counts as "speech" for the purpose of First Amendment
protections,"0 "[1]ike any other rule, the First Amendment does not
regulate the full range of human behavior.""1 The First Amendment
protects speech, not conduct. Vhile some actions are sufficiently
expressive to be considered speech for First Amendment purposes,42
conduct is not automatically protected simply because it involves
language in some way: "it has never been deemed an abridgement of
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely
because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed."43
If Section 230's rejection of settled principles of collective
responsibility is justified on free speech grounds, then it should not be
applied beyond the scope of what the First Amendment protects. But
"courts routinely interpret Section 230 to immunize all claims based
on third-party content," including "negligence; deceptive trade
practices, unfair competition, and false advertising; the common law
privacy torts; tortious interference with contract or business relations;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and dozens of other legal
doctrines""--coverage that well exceeds even the capacious
boundaries of First Amendment doctrine. As Justice Powell worried in
1978, "[w]hen the coverage of the First Amendment expands ... there

&

3 Brown, supra note 7.
40 See generally MARK V. TUSHET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
41 Frederick Schauer, The Politicsand Incentives ofFirstAmendment Coverage, 56 WM.

MARY L. REv. 1613, 1617-18 (2015).
See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (wearing
of black armbands conveyed message regarding a matter of public concern).
43 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
4 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the FirstAmendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. REFLECTION 33, 36-37 (2019).
42
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is an increased possibility that, out of necessity, some of the existing
doctrinal tools developed for a smaller area of coverage will have to be
modified, possibly with unfortunate consequiences." 45
Yet another justification offered for Section 230's grant of immunity
to online intermediaries not available to their offlime counterparts is
scale. Online social media platforms, for example, deal with millions,
sometimes billions, of pieces of content on a regular basis; no brickand-mortar bookstore approaches the number of transactions occurring
on Amazon.com every hour. The sheer volume of this content would
turn any duty of moderation into a Herculean effort.
But it is not obvious why the enormity of scale should translate into
less, rather than greater, responsibility for online intermediaries. For
one, more activity means more potential for harm, and secondly, it is;
precisely the extraordinary scale of Internet activity that helps generate
multi-billion-dollar profits-profits that could be put towards ensuring
that this activity is reasonably regulated.4 6
Section 230 establishes a dual regime of law, with one rule for offline
conduct and another for online conduct. But once Section 230's
expansive immunity has been embraced, there is no clear reason to
continue to restrict it to online activity. Offline entities can plausibly
complain that the differential treatment afforded by broad
interpretations of Section 230 violates principles of fairness and equal
protection, or to put it more bluntly: if they can do it, why can't we?
It is well worth asking how the dystopian state of affairs created by
Section 230 lives up to the parable of the Good Samaritan for which it
is named? In the Biblical account, a man is set upon by robbers who
beat him, steal his possessions, and leave him for dead. A priest comes

Schauer, supranote 41, at 1635 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978)).
45

46 See Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazardon Stilts:'Zeran's'Legacy,LAW.COM: THE
RECORDER (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:30 AM), https://www.1aw.com/therecorder/sites/therecord
er/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-on-stilts-zerans-legacy/?slreturn=20200117170709.
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across him but "passe[s] by on the other side." 4 7 A Levite does the
same. But the third man, the Samaritan, stops to help. He tends to the
man's wounds, takes him to an inn, and looks after him.
The moral of the parable is generally understood to be that a "Good
Samaritan" means helping another in need, even when one has no
obligation to do so. Section 230(c)(2), like offline "Good Samaritan"
laws, hews closely to this idea: providing immunity to those who
voluntarily take on a duty to aid not demanded by law. But as we have
seen, Section 230(c)(1) has been interpreted to ensure that this
protection extends not only to bystanders who attempt to help, but also
to bystanders who do nothing. Worse yet, it also extends to people
who are not bystanders at all, but actual participants in harmful
conduct. That is, Section 230 treats the priest, the Levite, and the
robbers the same as the Good Samaritan. In doing so, Section 230 not
only fails to encourage good behavior, but incentivizes evil behavior.
There is another, often overlooked layer to the story of the Good
Samaritan that offers even more insight into the gap between the Law
of Cyberspace and the Law of the Good Samaritan. The occasion for
the parable is a somewhat peculiar exchange between Jesus and a
lawyer. The lawyer wishes to know what he must do to attain eternal
life. Jesus responds, "What is written in the law? How do you read it?"
The lawyer answers, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your
heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, with all your mind, and
your neighbor as yourself." Jesus affirms that this is the correct
answer, but the lawyer is not satisfied, asking "Who is my neighbor?"
It is at that point that Jesus relates the story of the Good Samaritan,
which concludes by Jesus asking the lawyer, "Now which of these
three do you think seemed to be a neighbor to him who fell among the
robbers?" The lawyer replies, "He who showed mercy on him," and
Jesus says, "Go and do likewise."48
The answer to the question "Who is my neighbor?" is not, as it is often
assumed, the man beaten by robbers. In that conventional reading, the
47 Luke 10:31 (New International Version).
4' Luke 10:30-37 (New International Version).
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moral of the story is that we should have compassion for those in need,
even if we are in no way responsible for it. But as Jesus leads the
lawyer to conclude, the neighbor-the person whom the lawyer must
love as himself-is the Samaritan. The significance of this is made
apparent by considering the longstanding enmity, recounted in several
other New Testament passages, between Jews and Samaritans. By
naming a member of a despised group as the neighbor in the parable,
Jesus demonstrates the rigor of true compassion.
The deeper insight of the story of the Good Samaritan is that to love
one's neighbor is to love the one you have been taught to hate.
Whatever you would wish to be done to you, you should wish the
same to be done to them-good or ill. This principle of reciprocity can
be found in religions that precede Christianity, as well as in
philosopher Immanuel Kant's famous "categorical imperative," which
he considered to be the one indispensable moral rule: "Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law." 49 A version of it can be found as well
in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.50
It is worthwhile to ponder what the Internet might look like if it were
truly governed by the Law of the Good Samaritan. It is possible to
imagine an online world that rewards compassion and responsibility,
that harnesses technology's tremendous powers of communication and
connection to enlarge our humanity, and that urges us to take care of
not only our own tribe but of anyone in need.
But instead of encouraging the noblest goals of the law, the Law of
Cyberspace fundamentally unmakes the law. There is no obvious
stopping point to the Internet's erosion, and in some cases eradication,
of settled legal principles of immunity, complicity, free speech,
criminal law, and tort.

49

50

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (1982).
See MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 199-204 (2019).
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Back in 1996, Judge Easterbrook warned that the "Law of
Cyberspace" lacked the capacity to illuminate the entire law." More
than two decades later, we must reckon with its capacity to destroy it.

" See Easterbrook, supra note 1.

